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Abstract 
 
The objective of this research work is to mount Side channel attack particularly power 
analysis attack on FPGA Hardware implementation of CLEFIA block cipher. CLEFIA is 
claimed to be reliable cipher. CLEFIA specifications and design of algorithm   is available 
to evaluation by public, cryptographers for performance and security analysis. CLEFIA is 
an international standardized cipher in ISO/IEC lightweight cryptography. It has four 
branch generalized Feistel network structure. This structure can be implemented compactly 
in both in hardware and software. CLEFIA consists of Diffusion Switching Mechanism, 
which ensures immunity against major attacks. Moreover, the similarity of functions 
between the data processing part and the key scheduling part of CLEFIA reduces the gate 
size. 
  
Side channel attack mainly Differential Power Analysis attack(DPA) of CLEFIA is one of 
the major challenge for crypto groups as data and key generation functions share same 
structure Thus complicates the power attack specially in FPGA hardware implementation. 
Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) is also possible when fault is introduced into hardware. 
We are proposing a DPA on CLEFIA with 128 bit key on FPGA based hardware with 
selection function to analyze and extract the key bits. Attack requirements, method, setup 
and process are discussed in details. 
 
Considering its application potential of CLEFIA, as many hardware devices are being 
produced using it, so it is important to mount DPA attack on hardware including FPGA 
implementations of CLEFIA. 
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 1.0 Introduction 
 
Side channel analysis is a branch of cryptology using which sensitive information obtained 
by capturing and analyzing physical elements (like power, EM radiation, Sound etc.) of 
system rather than using computational weakness or mathematical consistency of cipher 
algorithm. Current practice to use many functions and round key during formation of cipher 
algorithms as well as using increased key bits size to resist computational attack. So it is 
more difficult to break cipher by computational analysis. Best alternate way is to break the 
algorithm, that is, Side Channel Analysis as shown in fig 1. 
 
 Figure 1 : Cryptographic process 
Side channel attacks are two types 1. Active 2. Passive. Under active attack, in the 
cryptographic device, its inputs, its environment are manipulated so that device behaves 
abnormally. By exploiting this behavior of device attacker may get the key information. 
Here, attacker tries to induce errors in the computation through fault-induction and then 
calculate the required keys by analysis of those induced faults. Here problem is gaining the 
access to device and inducing the required faults at desired rounds. Passive attacks like 
differential power analysis, where the attack is done on the information obtained from the 
power consumption pattern during execution of cipher. Here difficulty is several process 
are running in the hardware at a given time.  
They become the noise source for the cipher power trace capturing. Here Differential Side 
Channel Analysis will help to mount the attack .It is required to know the beginning of 
cipher rounds, synchronizing the traces with functions .Complex setup is required to record 
minute power variation corresponding to the cipher rounds. Differential Side Channel 
Analysis involves 
 
o Identifies the differences in side channel measurements which are not directly 
visible in   measurement traces. 
o Customized statistical methods are to be applied.  
o Targeting one specific intermediate result, which is in a specific part of the 
measurement traces.  
o A typical approach is to choose a selection function, which gives an intermediate 
result at the beginning or end of the algorithm.  
o The outcome of the selection function depends on the known plaintext or cipher 
text and a small   hypotheses made on the key bit value.  
o The result of the selection function enables to partition of overall measurement 
data for each hypothesis made. 
o If key hypothesis is correct, different statistical properties are shown on the two 
partitioning sets for given bits and traces in time which depend on the outcome 
of the selection function 
 
Several research groups have been working on CLEFIA [1], about analyses of its security, 
performance evaluations and attacks. But no one claimed the successful Differential Power 
Analysis (DPA) attacks of CLEFIA so far.  Differential Fault Analysis [4] on CLEFIA is 
recently published and we have also implemented the same. 
 
Yizhi Xu from UST, China [2] presented a concept of application of DPA introduced by 
the Kocher [3] to CLEFIA supported by simulation of experiments but not the practical 
attack where key bits are fully recovered.  
1.1 Study: 
 
Differential power analysis is one kind of side-channel attacks, it was introduced by Kocher 
et al [3]. This technique applied to extract secret keys by capturing, measuring and 
analyzing the power consumption of the cryptographic devices. DPA is proved to be an 
efficient method to attack the different types of implementations of specially block ciphers. 
 
DPA is where power traces corresponding the crypto operation are captured and analyzed. 
I have studied the theoretical aspects of DPA and its implementation on DES. In DPA, 
Statistical methods used for segregation of samples into different sets and signal processing 
methods are used for finding the correlation and extracting the key bits. Interestingly, DPA 
methods used for standard hardware implantation on Microcontrollers, Smartcards and 
Embedded processors are not effective if same is used for FPGA based hardware.  
 
Towards this different type of DPA methods including hamming weight model are also 
studied which are suitable for the FPGA based hardware implementations, which are 
widely used now a days. I also studied setup and instruments required for the 
implementation of CLEFIA in hardware, capturing the power traces and analysis of 
samples. 
  
2.0 CLEFIA Design 
 
CLEFIA, it is a 128 bit block cipher with three different key sizes (128/192/256 bits) .It 
was proposed by Sony corporation.  CLEFIA consists of two main parts: 1. data processing 
part and 2. Key scheduling part. CLEFIA consists of generalized Feistel structure with 4 
data lines, and the width of each data line is 32 bits. In addition in, there are key whitening 
parts at the beginning and at the end of the structure. For key generation, numbers of rounds 
for 128-bit is 18, 192-bit is 22 and 256-bit is 26.    
 
CLEFIA has mainly two processing parts one is for processing the data for encryption and 
decryption, second one for key generation part where round keys and whitening keys are 
generated from the main key. 
 
2.1 Data Processing Part 
 
CLEFIA [1] is based on the  four branch generalized Feistel network structure as shown in 
figure 2 given by SONY, Width of each data line(branch) is 32 bits. Additionally, key 
whitening functions present at the beginning and at the end of the data processing part. The 
number of rounds are depends on the key length. 
 
 Figure 2 :  Structure of data processing part 
 
The r-round operation of encryption function defined as:  
𝐶0
0| 𝐶1
0|𝐶2
0|𝐶3
0 = 𝑃0|(𝑃1  ⨁ 𝑊𝐾0)|𝑃2|(𝑃3⨁𝑊𝐾1)  
Where 𝐶0
𝑖 = 𝐶1
𝑖−1  ⨁ 𝐹0(𝐶0
𝑖−1, 𝑅𝐾2𝑖−2) 
              𝐶1
𝑖 = 𝐶2
𝑖−1 
              𝐶2 
𝑖 = 𝐶2
𝑖−1 ⨁𝐹1(𝐶2
𝑖−1, 𝑅𝐾2𝑖−2) 
              𝐶3
𝑖 = 𝐶0
𝑖−1 
And  
𝐶0| 𝐶1|𝐶2|𝐶3 = 𝐶3
𝑟|(𝐶0
𝑟⨁𝑊𝐾2)|𝐶1
𝑟|(𝐶2
𝑟⨁𝑊𝐾3)  
Typival Feistal function is like Byte wise round key mixing ,then S-Box lookup and finally 
Diffusion matrix multiplication. 
  
 
 
 
  
Figure 3 : Feistal function structure 
Where F0 and F1 is as given below with matrix values 
 
 
  
Figure 4 : Fo and F1 functions 
Two F-functions F0 and F1 used by GFNd;r are defined as follows: 
F0: (RK (32), x (32)) ↔ y (32) 
Step 1. T← RK ⨁ x 
Step 2. Let T = T0 |T1 | T2 | T3, Ti ∈ {0,1}8 
S-Box look up  
T0 ←S0 (T0); 
T1← S1 (T1); 
T2 ←S0 (T2); 
T3← S1 (T3) 
Step 3. Let y = y0 | y1| y2| y3,  yi  ∈ {0,1}8 
Finally diffusion matrix multiplication 
t(y0; y1; y2; y3) = M0 t(T0; T1; T2; T3) 
 
 
Similarly For F1 
 F0: (RK (32), x (32)) ↔ y (32) 
Step 1. T← RK ⨁ x 
Step 2. Let T = T0 |T1 | T2 | T3, Ti ∈ {0,1}8 
S-Box look up  
T0 ←S1 (T0); 
T1← S0 (T1); 
T2 ←S1 (T2); 
T3← S0 (T3) 
Step 3. Let y = y0 | y1| y2| y3,  yi ∈ {0,1}8 
Finally diffusion matrix multiplication 
t(y0; y1; y2; y3) = M1 t(T0; T1; T2; T3) 
 
 
Here S box 0 and 1 are 4 bit input output tables constructed using GF polynomial, Diffusion 
matrixes M0, M1 are 4*4 matrixes. 
 
2.2 Key Scheduling Part 
 
The key scheduling part of CLEFIA basically three types viz. 128, 192 and 256 bits and 
has the whitening keys WKi, 0 ≤ i ≤ 3 and   number of  round keys RKi, 0 ≤ i< 2r required 
for the data processing part. Assume K as main key and L as intermediate key.  
 
The key scheduling part mainly contains of two modules, 1. Generating L from K, and 2. 
Expanding K and L for generation of WKi and RKi. L is generated by mixing the constant 
values CONi and K using the general feistel network structure. These constants values are 
given by SONY. WKi is generated directly from K, and RKi is generated directly from 
ExOR operation of K, CONi, Land Σi (L), where Σ denotes bit-wise permutation function 
called Double Swap. 
 Round key generation can be summarized in the below given figure. 
 
 Figure 5 : Round key generation function 
 
Double swap function which does bit-wise permutation as given below. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 6 : Double swap function 
 
  
 3.0 Differential power analysis attack 
 
DPA is basically depends on the power consumed by the FPGA or any Hardware on the 
intermediate data values. Following steps are involved in attack procedure. 
 
 Selection of FPGA hardware with Power monitoring port. 
 HDL implantation of Cipher. 
 Trace capture setup including current probe with amplifier and oscilloscope. 
 SMA Cable setup for interconnectivity. 
 Development of Signal analysis algorithm to filter and implement selection 
function. 
 Trace capture and key bits extraction. 
 
 
3.1 DPA attack procedure: 
 
For  implementation of  DPA attack,   Frist  M encryption operations have to be performed 
using M   plaintexts P(m),m ∈ {1, ...,M} with  same key, and capturing the power traces 
T(P(m), t), t ∈ {1, ..., k}, where k denotes the number of a sample. Cipher texts C (m) are 
recorded for M operations. Let RKi represent the round key targeted for attack.  
 
As per CLEFIA   cipher structure, RKi is separated into four bytes, represented by RKi,b, 
where 0 ≤ b ≤ 3. There are two types of models exists for the relation between   power trace 
and values of intermediate data. They are the 1.  Hamming weight model   2.  Hamming 
distance model. The definition and tuning of the DPA selection function purely depends 
on the structure of algorithm and the specific implementation on FPGA hardware.  
 
For this attack Hamming weight model is used,  here output of the S-box corresponding to 
RKi,b  is selected as the intermediate data, represented by S(P(m), b,RKi,b,s), where P(m) is   
cipher text, b is the byte number of round key RKi, RKi,b,s ∈ {0, ..., 255} is our  hypothesis 
for RKi,b. Let W (.) represent the Hamming weight of a variable.  
 
For this selection function defined as 
D(P(m), b,RKi,b,s)  =    0,    If    W(S(P(m), b,RKi,b,s))  < 4 
                 1,    If     W(S (P (m), b, RKi, b, s)) > 4 
  
For every key round hypothesis RKi,b,s, the power traces T(P(m), t) are classified into two 
sets they are defined as 
T0  =  {T(P(m), t) | D(P(m), b,RKi,b,s) = 0}   
T1  =  {T(P(m), t) | D(P(m), b,RKi,b,s) = 1}   
Then, calculating a differential trace as defined below 
 
ΔD (t, b,RKi,b,s) 
 
Using a selection function, where |T1| and |T0| are the numbers of elements present in T1 
and T1. 
 
If round key hypothesis RKi,b,s is the correct value of RKi,b, then there would be  an clear 
peak in ΔD(t, b, RKi,b,s).  If RKi,b,s is incorrect, this no peak would be found.  
 
Here RK0 and RK1 can be obtained from C00 and C02,, that is, P0 and P2, which are known 
by attackers. As described above, main key calculated using DPA method. 
  
 
 
 
As per the definition of F0, we get 
  𝐹0(𝐶0
1, 𝑅𝐾2) 
                        = 𝐹0(𝐶1
0⨁𝑊𝐾0⨁𝐹0(𝐶0
0, 𝑅𝐾0), 𝑅𝐾2) 
                        = 𝐹0(𝐶1
0⨁𝐹0(𝐶0
0, 𝑅𝐾0), 𝑅𝐾2 ⨁𝑊𝐾0) 
Where know the value of C01 and C00   and RK0 can be obtained using DPA on the first 
round. 
So (RK2 ⊕WK0) can be obtained using DPA attack. 
 
Similar way (RK3 ⊕ WK1) also be obtained. Step by step process, using the DPA method, 
we will get RK4i, RK4i+1 ⊕ WK0, RK4i+2, RK4i+3 ⊕WK1, 0 ≤ i <r/2.  
 
On other side, we get RK2r−2 and RK2r−1 from Cr−1 0 and Cr−1 2,, that is, C0 and C2, which are 
already known. 
 
From the above obtained values, all round keys can be calculated RKi, 0 ≤ i < 2r and also 
the whitening keys WKi, 0 ≤ i ≤ 3. As per key scheduling algorithm, using round keys main 
key K can be calculated. Pictorial representation of attack procedure given below. 
 
 Figure 7 : DPA Process representation 
  
3.0 Implementation of CLEFIA: 
 
For hardware implementation of CLEFIA, I have selected 128 bit input plain text and key 
with four branch feistal structure consists of 18 round for data processing part including 
four whitening keys and 36 round keys. Its key generated using GFN structure with 12 
rounds .Using Xilinx ISE 14.2 tool, CLEFIA hardware implementation in VHDL is 
completed. After Synthesis targeting to the Xilinx vettex-5   FPGA the following resources 
are consumed.  
  
3.1 CLEFIA Implementation Results 
 
Selected Device: Virtex-5 FX 200-T 
 
Slice Logic Utilization:  
Slice Registers:         4969 out of 97280     5%   
Slice LUTs:               6245 out of 97280     6%   
Logic:                        4872 out of 97280     5%   
Memory (Kb):           1373 out of 26240     5%   
 
Timing Summary: 
--------------------------- 
Speed Grade: -1 
Minimum period: 7.537ns (Max Frequency: 132.679 MHz) 
Maximum combinational path delay: 5.607ns 
------------------------------ 
Specific Feature Utilization: 
Block RAM/FIFO:               15 out of    212     7%   
BUFG/BUFGCTRLs:          1   out of     32     3%   
DSP48Es:                             90 out of    128    70%   
  
It is consuming the resources more than the optimum implementation as round wise 
implementation enable clear demarcation and synchronization in traces for capture for 
power analysis. 
 
With the high density and lower core voltage FPGAs, DPA complexity is increasing 
multifold. Here we discuss the approach to capture the power traces when any block cipher 
running on a FPGA board. Generic FPGA boards have EMI filter, LVDOs, POLA devices 
in their power distribution network.   
 
 
  
4.0 DPA Setup and Process: 
 
Differential power analysis attack requires a very special setup including Target crypto 
device, Probes to monitor power, Amplifier to amplify the very minute variations emanate 
during crypto operations. This also improves the signals SNR for further processing 
.Amplified traces are fed to high sampling rate oscilloscope with low band width .Complete 
setup is shown below. In order to capture power traces general practice is to insert a 50 
ohm resistor in the power line for general hardware or to monitor current through a current 
probe. 
 
4.1 Setup diagram:  
 
 
Figure 8 : DPA setup diagram 
 
 
4.2 Actual setup @ Lab: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9 : DPA lab setup diagram 
 
4.3 Requirements: 
 
1. MSO – Tektronix 5104 
2. Current amplifier – Tektronix TCP A300 
3. Current probe 
4. FPGA Hardware – Xilinx ML 507 with power supply 
5. SMA, Ethernet, Serial cables 
6. PC with Xilinx ISE, EDK, Chip Scope Pro, Mat lab, with required toolbox loaded. 
 
All these are connected as shown in setup diagram. Hardware which is essential for 
capturing and analysis of wave forms. Here is the list of   Components with their 
functionality: 
 
1. Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA): It is a Virtex-5 FX-200-T chip in which 
hardware code, that is, CLEFIA is dumped. It works on core voltage VCCINT of 1.0 
V. Its I/O voltage with DCI is from +1.8 to 3.3 V. 
2.  Adapter: It is used to step down convert alternative current (AC) to direct current 
(DC). Output of this adapter is +5V which is suitable for FPGA board. 
3. Computer System: This the medium to synthesize the hardware code with the help 
of software   Xilinx ISE/EDK. The input is given/output read to FPGA with this system 
software only. 
4. Sensor probe: This is a current probe which is useful to record at a particular point 
of FPGA board preferably power port before filtering. Which is directly analyses in the 
oscilloscope. 
5. Amplifier: This is a current amplifier which is used to amplify the signal which is 
coming from FPGA board to oscilloscope. This can amplify the signal by increase in 
the scale of amplitude by 15 times more. This helps in analysis of coming signal in the 
oscilloscope resolution range. 
6. Oscilloscope: This is a digital oscilloscope (1GHz) used for actual storing waveform 
coming from FPGA board in the form of digital signal. This will also help in capture 
and save waveform in hardware on synchronization from FPGA board. It can intake 4 
input waveform simultaneously and also interface with Computer system. 
 
4.4 Attack Process: 
 
1. HDL code developed for given block cipher. 
2. Through EDK, Module with software registers to give input  and take output and 
UART interface developed 
3. Module to raise a trigger when encryption starts and lower when finished also 
developed. 
4. All the above three are fused into FPGA board. 
5. MSO Interface to read trace files developed. 
6. Matlab code for Analysis of traces using filters, Selection function will be 
developed. 
7. Finally a DPA module to interface all devices, Control all modules, generate input 
to board, capture traces and analyze key will be developed.   
 
4.5 Steps involved in capturing process:  
 
1. The flow starts with the PC sends inputs to the FPGA device and initializing MSO.  
2. PC sends input data and a command to start encryption to the FPGA device.  
3. The FPGA device receives the data and the command, raises a trigger signal and 
starts the encryption in FPGA. 
4. MSO acquires traces upon detecting the trigger edge and stop when trigger goes 
low. 
5. MSO reports the PC that acquisition is finished.  
6. Meanwhile, the target reports the PC that encryption is finished and returns the 
encryption result.  
7. MSO sends the traces to the PC.  
8. PC receives the trace, saves it and proceeds to the next capture cycle. After acquiring 
given number of traces,  
9. After completion of multiple acquitions of traces for several crypto operations PC 
starts analysis of Traces using statistical methods which are implemented in Mat 
lab. 
10. Based on the processing of data key bits are obtained. 
  
 5.0 DPA on ML507 platform. 
 
5.1 Capture process 
 
Capture the large signal traces of   probe (in the order of mV) and stored in MSO in CSV 
or other format. These values can be read and replayed in Malab as shown below. Having 
captured the multiple sets of power traces correlation between capture two sets calculated 
and plotted. However actual traces for CLEFIA operation are of very less magnitude, that 
is, in the order of micro amps, can only be captured using current probe along with a current 
amplifier. 
 
 FPGA board or Device which supports power trace capturing over SMA connector is 
required as this current probe supports Lowest measurable current of 1 milli Amp (at ± 2% 
accuracy at DC)  where Scope set to 1 mV/div and at a limited band width of  20 MHz 
only. 
 
To mount the attack on Xilinx ML507evaluation board, power traces be captured before 
the filter after voltage regulators. But this provision is not available in ML507.  FPGA core 
Vcc INT and device I/O VccO voltages are different, correlation of traces is different for 
these voltages.   
 
At this point we are unable to measure the power consumption (traces) of the device. For 
these attacks side channel evaluation boards (SASEBO) are required as capacitors are not 
mounted on them (FPGA board to power supply) to allow monitoring of small fluctuations 
in power consumption. For attack we have all the information you need except the secret 
key. Here using differential power analysis to extract the secret key using captured traces, 
plaintext, cipher text and the knowledge of the encryption algorithm by creating the 
hypothesis of the power consumption and after that correlating it with the measured traces. 
Here though useful traces are not captured, procedure for the entire processes is developed. 
 
 
Figure 10: Power traces diagram 
 
5.2 Synchronization 
 
In the process of generating trigger from FPGA board to run cipher module and initiate the 
capture, signals may be misaligned and synchronization may be lost. In that case 
identifying the specific round traces and removal of noise becomes difficult. For that proper 
synchronization must be ensured to record traces with respect to each functionality. 
Following steps would ensure the same. 
After generating trigger from FPGA board. 
 
 Plot one trace of one operation, check that it is complete. 
 
 Check the alignment of traces, ensure they overlay correctly to confirm that 
triggering works. 
 Select the appropriate part of the traces (e.g. containing the first round). Record the 
required number of traces. 
 Depending on   measurements, Traces are required to be corrected over mean value.   
It can done by subtracting each trace from its mean value. Then recover the secret 
key using the DPA with correlation coefficients. Some of traces captured for 
CLEFIA are shown below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Trigger diagram 
 
 
Figure 11: Power trace diagram (zoomed) 
  
5.3 Trace Analysis  
 
Set of 200 plaintexts using same key we obtain 200 cipher texts. During encryptions we 
measured power traces. Each trace has a length of 320000 samples (Typically). Each 
sample is represented by 8 bit unsigned value (Then length of the file is   320000 * 8 bits 
* 200 traces = 64 MB). These trace files will be analyzed trough the script of selection 
function. If proper alignment for capturing is done then the samples will be processed into 
sets then the selection function will be applied to get the correlation coefficients for each 
key bit.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Plotting of power traces 
  
6.0. Conclusion 
 
Study of CLEFIA Implementation of CLEFIA in VHDL and porting on to the Xilinx 
evaluation board is completed. Required DPA setup is completed with Xilinx Evaluation 
board .Complete Power analysis procedure has been established.    
 
Suitable FPGA hardware platform like SASEBO board has to be obtained so as to capture 
the measurable traces. Any FPGA board with proper power monitoring port with SMA 
connectivity is required to capture the traces in oscilloscope even at low band width. Thus 
the setup for mounting the attack on CLEFIA will be completed. After tuning the selection 
function to suit the trace properties viz. order of magnitude of amplitude/current, noise 
level present in traces and importantly synchronization with CLEFIA internal operation 
(data processing or round key generation) all the key bits will be obtained.  
 
DPA based attacks can perform much useful when other techniques are not useful to break 
cipher it is also faster than other techniques. However, this type of   attacks requires 
physical access to the hardware power ports in order to get the traces required for its 
execution and special setup.  
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